This paper compares the clinical trial strategies and performance of large, established ("mature") biopharmaceutical firms to those of smaller ("early stage") firms that have not yet successfully developed a drug. We study a sample of 235 cancer drug candidates that entered clinical trials during the period 1990-2002 and were sponsored by public firms. Early stage firms are more likely than mature firms to advance drug candidates from Phase I to Phase II clinical trials. However, early stage firms have much less promising clinical results in their Phase II trials and their Phase II drug candidates are also less likely to advance to Phase III and to receive Food and Drug Administration approval. This pattern is more pronounced for early stage firms with large cash reserves. The evidence points to an agency problem between shareholders and managers of singleproduct early stage firms who are reluctant to abandon development of their only viable drug candidates. By contrast, the managers of mature firms with multiple products in development are more willing to drop unpromising drug candidates. The findings appear to be consistent with the benefits of internal capital markets identified by Stein (1997).
INTRODUCTION
How does organizational scope affect investment behavior and performance? We study this question by examining the drug development behavior and performance of biopharmaceutical firms. We believe that drug development is an ideal setting in which to address this question for three reasons. First, there is considerable heterogeneity in how biopharmaceutical firms are organized. Some are well-established firms with many drugs on the market and a large portfolio of drug candidates at various stages of development.
Others are early stage firms with no products yet on the market and no more than one or two drugs in development. Second, there is a wealth of detailed, publicly available information on the project-level investments of biopharmaceutical firms, namely the clinical trials required by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine the safety and efficacy of drug candidates. Finally, these investments have measurable outcomes. Thus, one can compare, at a very fine-grained level, the investment behavior and performance of firms that differ in their organizational scope.
Why might we expect the scope of an organization to affect its investment behavior and performance? Our hypothesis is a variant of Stein (1997) who identifies the conditions under which an internal capital market that allocates funds across n competing projects is preferable to an external capital market that funds n single-project firms. In his framework, the problem with single-project firms is that when they have poor investment opportunities they may still invest because their managers will be reluctant to return funds to shareholders and lose the private benefits that come from running firms and projects. This is less of a problem in an internal capital market because managers have a broader range of projects in which to invest, allowing them to get both private benefits and better projects.
This basic logic fits closely with the biopharmaceutical industry. The biggest investments in this industry are the clinical trials that are required for a drug to be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
1 A particular drug candidate must go through three phases of clinical trials on human subjects: small Phase I trials designed in most cases to test a drug's safety; larger Phase II trials to test both its safety and efficacy; and finally very large Phase III trials with as many as a several thousand subjects. At each point along the way, a company must decide based on scientific, clinical, and financial information whether to continue to the next, more expensive phase of clinical trials.
We argue that the managers of early-stage biopharmaceutical firms ---those with only one or two drugs in development ---are excessively reluctant to end clinical trials after Phase I. Pulling the plug then would mean either that the firm would have to be liquidated or that research on a new drug would have to be started. If the firm is liquidated, the managers would lose the private benefits that come from running the company. These private benefits are best thought of as firm-specific human capital. If the firm is not liquidated, but instead a new research program is begun to replace the failed one, the managers might also lose private benefits to the extent that their human capital is tied to the abandoned research program. Therefore, we argue that managers of early-stage firms would be willing to take marginally uneconomic projects forward from Phase I to Phase II.
This sort of problem is less severe in mature biopharmaceutical firms with numerous drug candidates in pre-clinical and clinical testing. The managers who make the decision to move a Phase I trial into Phase II choose among a portfolio of drug candidates. While they may benefit from moving drugs along in the pipeline, it is unlikely that they benefit disproportionately from any particular drug being advanced.
Thus, we would expect them to choose to advance drugs with the highest value to the company. This is the essence of Stein's (1997) argument on the value of internal capital markets.
This perspective suggests that: (1) early-stage firms will be more aggressive in taking trials from Phase I to Phase II; (2) early-stage firms will be more likely to have unpromising clinical results at Phase II; and (3) early stage firms are less likely to take a trial forward from Phase II to Phase III.
Financial constraints could mitigate the tendency of early stage firms to be overly aggressive in moving forward from Phase I to Phase II. To the extent that firms lack the cash reserves to fund Phase II trials, we would expect them to be less prone to move forward and, conditional on moving forward, to have better clinical results. These low cash, early-stage firms would therefore also be more likely to move forward from Phase II trials to Phase III.
Our empirical results are in line with these predictions. The sample we analyze consists of 235 Phase I trials for drugs to treat cancer. We find that early-stage firms are more prone than mature firms to advance into Phase II trials within two years of initiating their Phase I trial (61.4% vs. 45.3%). Moreover, if an early stage firm advances to Phase II, the clinical results of the Phase II trial are worse. In Phase II trials conducted by early stage firms, the percentage of patients exhibiting some shrinkage of their tumors ---a key marker of success of a Phase II trial ---is less than half that of trials conducted by mature firms (6% vs. 12%). Given the poor performance of Phase II trials sponsored by early stage firms, it is not surprising that these firms are also much less likely than mature firms to move into Phase III trials within a three-year period (13.6% vs. 34.9%). This difference is driven to a very large extent by early stage firms with large cash reserves. These results point to agency problems in external capital markets that lead to over-investment. They suggest that internal capital markets play a role in mitigating these over-investment problems (Stein, 1997) and that large cash reserves exacerbate the extent of over-investment (Jensen, 1986) .
Our findings connect in important ways to three literatures. The first is the literature on the costs and benefits of internal capital markets. Much of this literature suggests that internal capital markets lead to investment inefficiencies due to crosssubsidization of divisions in low-growth industries by those in high growth industries (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000 , Scharfstein, 1998 , Shin and Stulz, 1998 and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000 . Another line of the empirical literature argues that internal capital markets enable firms to redeploy capital from unprofitable sectors to more profitable ones (Khanna and Tice, 2001, and Maksimovic and Phillips 2002) .
This paper is also related to the literature on free cash flow and investment (Jensen, 1986) claiming that firms with large cash flows, cash reserves, or debt capacity, tend to over-invest. There are many papers that try to test this hypothesis, but the ones closest to ours are those that look at investments at the project level. Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) find that the stock price reaction to the announcement of an acquisition is smaller when bidding firms have excess cash flow. More recently, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find that firms with excess cash flow tend to bid more for oil and gas leases and that these leases are, on average, less productive.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the determinants of success in drug development. The closest link is to Danzon, Nicholson, and Pereira (2003) who estimate the effect of experience on the probability that firms move forward in the clinical trials process. They find that small firms are slightly more likely than large firms to advance from Phase I to Phase II, and that the effect is reversed for Phase II to Phase III transitions. They interpret these findings as evidence that there is learning-by-doing in the management of clinical trials; however, our findings suggest that the higher Phase II success rates of large firms may not be the result of learning-by-doing but rather may be the result of agency problems at small firms that lead them to bring poor drug candidates into Phase II trials.
2 2 Cockburn and Henderson (2001) examine the determinants of success at the level of a research program (e.g. cardiac and circulatory) rather than at the level of a particular drug candidate. They find that firms with a broader range of research program are more likely to end up with FDA-approved drugs. Given the different unit of analysis it is difficult to link their results to ours.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines a simple framework to structure our thinking about the agency problems that arise in biopharmaceutical firms.
Section 3 outlines the construction of the database and Section 4 presents the results.
Section 5 concludes.
A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK
This section outlines a very simple framework for comparing the investment behavior of early-stage biopharmaceutical firms to that of mature biopharmaceutical firms. We model the decision of whether to advance from a Phase I clinical trial, the earliest and least expensive phase of clinical development, to a Phase II clinical trial.
Based on the results of the Phase I trial, the manager assesses the probability that a Phase II trial will be "successful," and that he would want to go forward to Phase III.
"Successful" is in quotation marks because a clinical trial does not really "succeed" or "fail." Rather, the results are often difficult to interpret, with reasonable people differing on the interpretations. For simplicity, however, we suppose that if the trial is successful, further development of the drug has an expected discounted payoff of X > 0. If the trial is unsuccessful the expected payoff is zero. Let p 2 be the probability of success. Let I 2 be the cost of conducting a Phase II trial. Finally, suppose that A is the liquidation value of the compound if it does not advance to Phase II. Then, the first-best decision rule is to go forward to Phase II provided:
(1)
Would an early stage firm use this decision rule? We argue that the answer is no because the managers (or founders) of early stage firms derive private benefits, b, from their projects. In this case, the condition would be (2)
As a result, an early stage firm would be more prone to advance to Phase II than would be implied by the first-best condition (1).
What are the managers' private benefits in the context of drug development? One possibility is that managers have project-specific human capital that they would lose if they abandon the project and try to develop another drug. A second possibility is that managers have firm-specific human capital that they would lose if they abandon the project and the firm is liquidated. Finally, one can interpret b as a measure of managerial over-optimism about the expected payoffs from the project.
Like the managers of early stage firms, the managers of drug development projects in mature firms are also likely to derive private benefits from drug development.
However, unlike early stage firms, the decision of whether to advance to Phase II is not made by these managers, but rather higher-level managers who choose among a portfolio of drug candidates. These managers might derive private benefits from drug development, but there is no reason to believe that they derive benefits from one particular project over another. Thus, if they cannot choose to undertake all of the projects, they will choose those with the highest expected value exclusive of private benefits. This is essentially Stein's (1997) argument for the efficiency of internal capital markets.
This simple framework generates two empirical predictions. From a comparison of (1) and (2) we get the first prediction. 
DATA
In order for a drug to be marketed, the FDA requires that it go through a series of clinical trials on human subjects. Phase I trials ---the earliest and smallest of the clinical trials ---are typically conducted on fewer than 30 patients, are designed to determine a drug's safety. For most diseases, these trials are performed using healthy subjects, although cancer drug trials, the focus of our study, are conducted on subjects with the 
Sample Construction
The starting point for the construction of our sample is a database we assembled Phase I trials are identified by searching all the abstracts that include in their title or in the abstract itself the words "Phase I", "Phase I/II", "dose-finding", "new", and "novel". From this list, only the ones that indeed describe a Phase I clinical trial are kept.
Abstracts that describe one or more of the following are excluded: combination trials (i.e. trials using multiple drug compounds); agents targeting pediatric cancers; agents that were previously reviewed by the FDA; radiation therapies or immuno-therapies; herbal medication; supportive care; and trials on non-human subjects. Combination therapies are excluded because it is very difficult to determine how successful a clinical trial is when a compound is tested in conjunction with another given that it is hard to determine the baseline response rate of the other compound. It also makes sense to exclude agents targeting pediatric cancers because the approval process for these drugs is quite different.
Agents previously reviewed by the FDA add to the complexity of the data collection and therefore are excluded. The other trials are excluded because they are not drugs per se.
More details about the sample can be found in Roberts et. al. (2004) . Our analysis centers on the 235 Phase I trials undertaken by the public firms in our database. We exclude the 65 drug candidates sponsored by private firms at this point because it is difficult to get balance sheet data on these firms, and because these firms raise issues, such as the role of venture capital, that are beyond the scope of this paper. The PharmaProjects database also track compounds through their stages of development, from as early as pre-clinical laboratory studies to FDA approval. Thus, we were able to reconstruct the timeline of development including follow-on clinical trials in Phase II and Phase III. We also collected information from this database on the kinds of cancer the trials were targeting, 5 the market size of the indication being targeted, and the pharmacological properties of the drug candidate. The last of these describes a drug's mechanism of action in the body, through which it exerts its therapeutic effect, i.e. it identifies the biological agent or process the drug stimulates or inhibits. This information will be useful to us in constructing measures of the novelty of a particular drug candidate.
Information on Clinical Trials
Our study focuses on four aspects of clinical development: the decision of the company to take the project forward from Phase I to Phase II; the clinical outcome of the Phase II study; the decision to move from Phase II to Phase III; and ultimate FDA approval. Table 2 The mean time between initiation of the first Phase II trial and first Phase III trial is 27.1 months ( Table 2 , Panel A), with almost 60% moving forward within two years and 76% moving forward within three years (Table 2 , Panel B). The mean length between trials is comparable to numbers reported in the DiMasi study.
Of course, not all trials move forward to the next phase. As Table 2 , Panel C
shows, 67% move forward from Phase I to Phase II as compared to 71% in the DiMasi study. Note however that our sample is right censored; for Phase I trials begun later in the sample, there are only a few years during which the trial could have moved forward.
Given that the lion's share of Phase I trials move forward within three years, this right censuring of Phase II trials is not a major issue. 
Information on Companies
Table 4 presents summary data (deflated to the year 2000) on the public companies sponsoring the trials in the sample. On average, the public companies are very large, with mean revenues of over $8 billion, mean assets of almost $11 billion, mean cash of close to $2 billion and mean R&D of about $1 billion. The average market capitalization is over $38 billion and mean Q is 10.2. On average, the firms were public for almost 26 years before embarking on the Phase I trials in our sample.
These averages mask considerable heterogeneity in the data. The 25 Because we do not have direct information on drug revenues by company, our proxy for whether a firm is early stage is whether the firm has revenues less than $30 million deflated to 2000. The revenues of these firms typically come from two sources:
milestone payments from other firms as part of alliances and contract R&D work. There are a few firms with revenues greater than $30 million, but less than $250 million. We found that these firms all had drugs that were on the market or about to be on the market, so we consider them mature firms.
Panels B and C of Table 4 break out the sample into mature and early stage firms.
Fifty-nine percent of the Phase I trials are done by mature firms, and the remainder are done by early stage firms. Not surprisingly, the differences between these firms are very large in terms of cash, R&D, and market capitalization.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we compare the decisions of early stage and mature firms to move forward in the clinical trials process.
A. Basic Analysis
A. 1 Phase I to Phase II Transition Probabilities. We start by estimating probit models of the decision to go from Phase I to Phase II within two years. We use a twoyear cutoff on the Phase II decision for two reasons. One reason is that, without a cutoff, Phase I trials that were begun in the early part of the sample would be more likely to be taken forward. If there is an over-representation of one type of firm in the early period, this would bias our findings. The second reason to use a time cutoff is to measure the aggressiveness with which firms move forward in the clinical trials process. Note that 69% of the agents that are taken forward to Phase II by the public companies are taken forward within two years. To avoid making seemingly arbitrary cutoffs, we will also estimate Cox proportional hazard models. This allows us to estimate the probability per year that a firm takes a trial forward.
The key regressor in our model is, Early Stage, a dummy variable for whether the drug's sponsor is an early stage biopharmaceutical firm. We also include a set of controls: information on the clinical outcome at Phase I ---response rate and toxicity;
whether the drug is a biologic agent (as opposed to a chemical compound); whether the drug was sponsored at one point by the National Institutes of Health or any of its affiliate organizations; the novelty of the agent under investigation; and the potential market size of the drug.
Before getting to the regressions it is worth simply comparing the Phase II This difference is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
The probit regressions in Table 5 show that this finding is robust to the inclusion of various controls. The reported numbers are the marginal effects of a unit increase in the regressors, not coefficient estimates from the regression. Column 3 of Table 5 reports results that address these possibilities by adding two controls to the regression. The first control is a set of two market size dummies that come from estimates in the PharmaProjects database. The first dummy is for whether the market size is between $500 million and $2 billion, and the second dummy is for whether the market size is greater than $2 billion. The excluded dummy is for whether the market size is less than $500 million. Although the estimated effects of these dummies are positive, they are not statistically significant. Given that an overwhelming majority of the drug candidates target a market size in the $500 million to $2 billion range, it is not a surprising finding. In addition, as noted earlier, most Phase I cancer trials target cancer in general, not specific cancers, so it is unlikely that there would be much variation in market size at the Phase I stage.
The last regression in Table 5 also includes a measure of the drug candidate's novelty. Novelty is calculated in the following way. As noted in Section 3,
PharmaProjects contains a pharmacological description of each drug candidate. Thus, for each pharmacological description we rank drug candidates chronologically, with the nth drug candidate chronologically within a certain category getting the rank of n. A drug candidate with a higher n is considered less novel. For example, in 1989, ScheringPlough was the first to conduct a clinical trial using a DNA antagonist (Tomozolomide).
In 2000, Access Pharma also began clinical trials of a DNA antagonist, but it was the twentieth such clinical trial, making it less novel by our measure. The average n in our sample of mature firms is 24.6, while the average for early stage firms is 22.0 a statistically insignificant difference.
In the regression in column 3 of These include multiple trials conducted on a single agent for different indications. We are unable to find clinical information on a number of the trials that we know were initiated either because the study was not completed or because the study abstract was never published in Papers/Proceedings. Another way to see whether early stage firms are going after higher payoff projects is to look at their payoffs when they actually succeed in launching a drug. There are 29 product launches in our sample, only seven of which are by early stage firms. We were able to collect information on product sales in the first three years after the product launch for all seven launches by early stage firms and 17 of the 22 product launches by mature firms. The differences are quite striking, but are the opposite of what one would expect if early stage firms are taking bigger risks. As can be seen from Table 10 , in each of the three years, the mature firms sell considerably more than the early stage firms. In the first year after launch, the sales of products launched by early stage firms are $12.7 million on average as compared to $99.7 million for mature firms. In the second year, the average is $61.3 million for early stage firms as compared to $141.3 million for mature firms. In the third year, early stage firms sell $108.4 million, whereas mature firms sell $204.3 million on average.
In five instances, we were unable to find information on the sales of products by mature firms. One might be concerned that when sales are very low for such firms, this information is less likely to be disclosed. Even so, if one assumes that sales for these products are zero, the average sales of products launched by mature firms are still greater that those of early stage firms in each of the three years following product launch. 
B. The Effect of Financial Resources on the Clinical Trials of Early Stage Firms
The previous sub-section presents evidence that early stage firms are more prone than mature firms to move forward from Phase I proceed to Phase II, whereas 31 (75.6%) out of the 41 Phase I trials conducted by the high-cash firms proceed to Phase II. Thus, the Phase II transition probability for the lowcash early-stage firms is only slightly higher than that of mature firms (45.3%), whereas the transition probability of the high-cash firms is significantly higher than those of the constrained early stage firms and the mature firms. This result is reflected in the probit regressions in Table 11 . As before, none of the controls is statistically significant nor do they impact the estimated effects of Early Stage dummies. III. The Phase II success rate of the high-cash firms is obviously much lower than that of the low-cash firms and the mature firms (34.9%). The success rate of the early stage constrained firms is lower than that of the mature firms, but the difference is not statistically significant. Again, these finding are reflected in the probit regressions, which are presented in Table 13 .
Estimating Proportional Hazard Models
As discussed above, our data is right censored by which we mean that some drugs 
(t).
We report the results of our survival analysis in Table 14 . We use the same controls as in the previous section. The numbers reported are hazard ratios. In column 1, the estimated effect of being an early stage company is large and statistically significant; it indicates that early stage firms have a 58% higher hazard of moving to Phase II than do mature firms. The second column breaks out high-cash and low-cash firms. Not surprisingly, the high-cash firms have an even higher hazard ratio; they are 123% more likely than mature firms to transition from Phase I to Phase II. The increased hazard for the low-cash firms is 24%%, but it is statistically insignificant.
Columns 3 and 4 describe a similar analysis, although in this case we measure the hazard of moving from Phase II to Phase III. The results on Phase II to Phase III transitions are similar to those discussed earlier. The hazard ratio for the early stage firms is 0.39, indicating that their hazard of progressing from Phase II to Phase III is less than half that of mature firms. This estimate is statistically significant. The effects for the early stage high-cash firms and early stage low-cash firms are similar.
CONCLUSION
We show that early stage biopharmaceutical firms are more aggressive than mature biopharmaceutical firms in bringing their drug candidates forward from Phase I to Phase II clinical trials. However, the drug candidates they bring to Phase II appear to be less promising; conditional on making it to Phase II, patients in trials conducted by early stage firms are much less likely to show some tumor shrinkage and these drug candidates are much less likely to advance to Phase III. These findings are driven to a great extent by the sub-sample of early stage firms with large cash reserves.
Our findings point to an agency problem between shareholders and managers of single-product early stage firms who are reluctant to pull the plug on their only viable drug candidates. We argue that the interests of managers of mature firms are more aligned with their shareholders. With their large portfolio of drug candidates, managers of these firms are more willing to pull the plug on unpromising drug candidates because they have other ones they can bring to clinical trials. The findings appear to be consistent with the benefits of internal capital markets identified by Stein (1997) .
There are a number of ways in which we hope to build on this research. First, it is worth investigating why there are big differences in the behavior of early stage firms.
Part of the answer may lie in understanding why some firms have more cash on hand than others. One possibility is that firms are more prone to raise equity capital during periods when biopharmaceutical firms are more highly valued. These funds give managers considerable freedom in the conduct of clinical trials. By contrast, when market valuations in this sector are low, firms tend to rely more heavily on alliances in which control over clinical trials is shared by the firm and its alliance partner (Lerner, Shane and Tsai, 2003) . Thus, understanding the role of the equity markets and alliances in the clinical trials process is very high on our research agenda. 8 Second, we have ignored differences that may exist in the drug development strategies of mature firms. Although our evidence suggests that having more drugs in the pipeline makes firms more selective on average and results in a higher Phase II success rate, the composition of this pipeline and the organizational structure of these firms could have an effect on their decision making. For example, if cancer drugs are a large part of a company's overall portfolio, is it more or less selective in its decision to move forward to Phase II? Or if the drug candidate was acquired in a merger, how does it affect the transition probability?
Finally, it would be worth examining the 65 trials that are conducted by the private firms in our sample. We suspect that many of these firms are still being funded by venture capitalists. In theory, it is not clear whether the existence of venture capital funding exacerbates or mitigates the agency problem in drug development. On the one hand, venture capitalists fund companies in stages, disbursing funds only when they are needed. To the extent that venture capitalists are able to assess the prospects of the drug, they would not choose to fund drugs with low expected payoffs. On the other hand, the goal of venture capitalists may not be to maximize the value of the portfolio company, but rather the shorter-run probability that the firm can be taken public. Gompers (1996) has shown that this incentive is particularly strong among young venture capital funds with limited track records since they need to convince potential limited partners that they have made good portfolio investments. Thus, if a company is better able to go public if it has later stage clinical trials, venture capitalists may encourage early stage firms to move clinical trials forward even if the expected payoffs are low.
Our findings raise broader issues about the creation and survival of biopharmaceutical startups. If the R&D process in early stage firms is inefficient, as we suggest, then it is natural to ask why such firms would ever be created and how they could survive in parallel with mature biopharmaceutical firms that seem not to be plagued by these inefficiencies. Why wouldn't the founders of biopharmaceutical firms ---most of whom are academic scientists ---sell their ideas to mature firms with diverse product portfolios who can manage clinical development more efficiently? It is important to note that many of them do in fact sell their scientific discoveries to established firms.
However, many do not because in doing so they give up control of follow-on scientific and clinical advances that emerge in the process of development. While a scientist could, in principle, be compensated for these follow-on discoveries, given the difficulty of writing complete contracts, it is unlikely that he would be compensated as much as if he retained control and developed the idea in his own firm. Thus, one potential benefit of founding a firm to commercialize a scientific discovery is that it provides high-powered incentives for discovery. The potential cost ---documented in our research ---is that it provides high-powered incentives to advance drugs through clinical trials even though it may be inefficient to do so. This suggests that there are costs and benefits of conducting scientific discovery within different organizational forms. A fuller understanding of these costs and benefits should be the goal of future research.
Table 1 Sample Construction: Identifying Phase I Clinical Trials
The initial sample summarized in this table is from Roberts et. al. (2004) . It is constructed by searching for Phase I clinical trials listed in annual publications of Papers/Proceedings of the American Society of Clinical Oncology from 1990-2002. For each year, the table lists the number of abstracts identified, the number of abstracts eliminated from the sample for each of the main reasons described in the text, the number of abstracts meeting the selection criteria, and the number of unique drug agents meeting the selection criteria.
Year

Number of ASCO Abstracts Radiation
Chemotherapy Pediatrics 
Combination Trials
Table 4 Summary Statistics on Sample Companies
This table report summary statistics on the public companies in our sample. We use Standard & Poor's Compustat, Compustat Canada, and Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial. For comparability, all the financial numbers are converted to million U.S. Dollars deflated to the year 2000. All the figures are for the year in which each drug went to Phase I clinical trials. Revenues, Assets, Cash, R&D, and Book Value are from the respective items in Compustat. Market Cap is the number of outstanding shares at the end of the calendar year multiplied by the share price at the end of the calendar year. Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of assets less the book value of equity to the book value of assets. Panel A reports the full sample; Panel B reports the sub-sample of mature firms; and Panel C reports the complimentary sub-sample of early-stage firms. We define an early stage firm as one with revenues less than or equal to $30 million deflated to the year 2000. . The regressors also include a set of controls for clinical results of the Phase I trials, as well as characteristics of the drug in development. Response Rate I is the percentage of patients whose tumor shrank in the Phase II trials. Toxicity is the percentage of patients who had a toxic reaction to the drug in the Phase I trials. Biologic is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the drug is a biologic drug, 0 if it is a chemical drug. NIH Sponsored is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the National Institutes of Health (NIH) or any of its affiliate institutes such as the National Cancer Institute (NCI) sponsored the drug. The regressions also control for the potential financial profit to be expected from the development of the drugs. One of the controls is the PharmaProjects' estimated market size of the targeted indication. We use two dummy variables, one for whether the estimated market size is between $500 million and $2000 million and another for whether the estimated market size exceeds $2000 million. Another control measures the novelty of the drugs. We measure this by recording the pharmacological description (a drug's mechanism of action in the body through which it exerts its therapeutic effect) and ranking the drug by the number of drugs developed for cancer with the same pharmacological description prior to this drug. Novelty is the log of the inverse of this rank.
(1) Note: We report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. In parenthesis are the z-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors. We cluster around the phase I year. We also control for the number of previous treatments the patients received prior to joining the trial, and for the stage of the cancer the patient is in. Columns (1), (2), and (3) use the sub-sample of public firms that moved to Phase II within 2 years of starting Phase I trials. Column (3) uses the full sample. In parenthesis are the t-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors.
(1) . The regressors also include a set of controls for the characteristics of the drug in development. One of the controls is the PharmaProjects' estimated market size of the targeted indication. We use two dummy variables, one for whether the estimated market size is between $500 million and $2000 million and another for whether the estimated market size exceeds $2000 million. Another control measures the novelty of the drugs. We measure this by recording the pharmacological description (a drug's mechanism of action in the body, through which it exerts its therapeutic effect) and ranking the drug by the number of drugs developed for cancer with the same pharmacological description prior to this drug. Novelty is the log of the inverse of this rank.
(1) 
Number of Observations
122
Note: We report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. In parenthesis are the z-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors. We cluster around the phase I year.
Table 9 Current Status of the Drugs
This table reports the current status of the drugs in our sample according to PharmaProjects. NDR -No Development Reported, is the status assigned by The PharmaProjects when there is no information about a drug and it seems the drug is not under development anymore (although the company has not officially announced that the drug has been discontinued). Discontinued refers to drugs for which the company has announced that it has ceased development. Pre-Registration refers to drugs for which the company is in the process of filing a NDA (New Drug Application) with the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) or has announced that it intends to do so . Launched drugs are those drugs that have been approved by the FDA and are on the market. Panel A reports the statistics for all the drugs; Panel B reports the statistics for the drugs that have moved to Phase II within two years of Phase I initiation. . We also include a dummy for early stage companies that are not financially constrained (those early stage companies with more that $30 million of cash deflated to the year 2000). The regressors also include a set of controls for clinical results of the Phase I trials, as well as characteristics of the drug in development. Response Rate I is the percentage of patients whose tumor shrank in the Phase II trials. Toxicity is the percentage of patients who had a toxic reaction to the drug in the Phase I trials. Biologic is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the drug is a biologic drug, 0 if it is a chemical drug. NIH Sponsored is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the National Institutes of Health (NIH) or any of its affiliate institutes such as the National Cancer Institute (NCI) sponsored the drug. The regressions also control for the potential financial profit to be expected from the development of the drugs. One of the controls is the PharmaProjects' estimated market size of the targeted indication. We use two dummy variables, one for whether the estimated market size is between $500 million and $2000 million and another for whether the estimated market size exceeds $2000 million. Another control measures the novelty of the drugs. We measure this by recording the pharmacological description (a drug's mechanism of action in the body, through which it exerts its therapeutic effect) and ranking the drug by the number of drugs developed for cancer with the same pharmacological description prior to this drug. Novelty is the log of the inverse of this rank.
PANEL A: All the drugs
(1) Note: We report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. In parenthesis are the z-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors. We cluster around the Phase I year. [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . If more than one trial was undertaken for a certain indication, we average them, weighting by the number of patients. Because indications have different baseline response rate, we control for each indication by including indication dummies based on categories of the American Cancer Society. We also control for the number of previous treatments the patients received prior to joining the trial, and for the stage of the cancer the patient is in. Columns (1), (2), and (3) use the sub-sample of public firms that moved to Phase II within 2 years of starting Phase I trials. Column (3) uses the full sample. In parenthesis are the t-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors.
(1) The model estimated is a probit model. The dependent variable is the probability of advancing from phase II to phase III in the 3 years following phase II, thus it takes one of two values: 1 if the drug moved to phase II and 0 if not. We define an early stage company as one that has revenues (deflated to the year 2000) of less than 30$m. We define a financially constrained company as one that has less than 30$m in cash and short-term investments (Deflated to the year 2000). We regress this probability on a dummy if the company is an early stage company and not financially constrained and on another dummy if it is an early stage company that is financially constrained. Market size -We use 3 dummies whether the potential market size is up to 500$m, between 500 and 2000$m and more than 2000$m. Novelty of the drugs -for every drug we record its pharmacological description (a drug's mechanism of action in the body, through which it exerts its therapeutic effect) and rank the drug by the number of drugs developed for cancer with the same pharmacological description prior to this drug. Novelty is the log of the inverse of this rank.
(1) Note: We report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. In parenthesis are the z-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors. We cluster around the Phase I year.
Table 14 Cox Proportional Hazard Model
We use a Cox proportional hazard model, following the specification outlined in Cox (1975) as a methodology developed to analyze survival data. We do so in order to account for the possible right censoring in our data. A drug is assumed to have a certain probability of succeeding in each period. Success is defined as the event of moving from phase I to phase II, or the event of moving from phase II to phase III. The instantaneous probability of success at any given time t is called the hazard rate, h(t), defined as: Note: We report the hazard rate for an infinitesimal change in time. In parenthesis are the z-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors.
